CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Soybeans are currently produced and marketed through the commodity system. In such a system, soybeans from numerous producers are commingled at the local elevator and sold as commodity grain. Profits from production depend on the total output of soybeans. The incentive system therefore encourages growers to select high yielding varieties of soybeans. However, the value of soybeans to the processor depends on the quantities of soybean meal and oil that can be produced from a bushel of soybeans. The outputs of soybean meal and oil depend on the components, protein and oil contained in the soybeans. In an efficient market the price of soybeans reflects the value of protein and oil contained in the soybeans. Such a system in which the price of a commodity is set in accordance with the sum of the value of its components is called component pricing (Perrin, 1980) . Such a price would give incentives to growers to select varieties with higher · protein and oil contents in them. Although technology to measure protein and oil content using near infrared technology (NIR.) is easily available, component pricing based on protein and oil is not commonly used in the soybean industry t. One possible reason is that the gains from such a system are not certain. The potential inverse relationships between soybean yield and protein (Hanson, 1991) and between protein and oil (Leffel, 1998) have an impact on the total value from the soybean crop. Moreover, the production of components varies considerably across regions and years . This brings in additional risk in production that will have to be shared between the processor and the grower.
This study attempts to address these issues through contract theory. A set of component prices is developed in a scenario where high value soybeans are grown under a contract between the processor and the grower. A processor would be willing to pay these prices to growers as incentives for growing soybeans with increased protein and oil. Since processors would want to maximize profits per bushel t One processor Ag Processing Inc. (AGP) constituted a premium based on oil content in 1999. This was extended to include premiums for protein in 2001. of soybeans processed, the incentive system would encourage grnwers to plant varieties that have higher components in them. The objective of this study is to design a contract to produce soybeans based on protein and oil content. This would include a set of component prices as incentives to grow soybeans with higher protein and oil content and a rule to share production risk between the processor and the grower. An estimate of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting is made and a method to select varieties that processors would want to implement by contracting is proposed.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
One of the earliest attempts to price soybeans based on its protein and oil content was made by Updaw(l976) . He used regression equations to calculate the quantities of meal and oil from the protein and oil percentages of the soybeans. The average oil yield was subtracted from the sample oil yield to give an appropriate discount or premium. The protein percentages of the meal were then calculated from the estimated meal quantities by the use of a regression equation and historic USDA data. An average value for the soybean meal yield and protein percentage was calculated and subtracted from the sample value to obtain a discount or premium. The oil and protein premiums and di scounts were then summed for each sample to assign a total premium or discount. This method does not take into account the meal and oil prices and therefore does not measure accurately the marginal value of soybeans in processing.
The development of the Estimated Processed Value (EPV) model ) improved accuracy in estimating the quanti6es of meal and oil from soybeans with lrnown protein and oil content. The model predicts the yield of crude soybean oil and soybean meal from the processing of soybeans m a solvent extraction plant under given soybean composition and processing conditions. The yields and prices of the components, meal. oil and hulls were used to calculate the estimated processed value of soybeans in dollars.
where EPV is the estimated processed value in dollars per bushel Pm is the meal price after discounts from trading rules in dollars per ton P 0 is the oil price in dollars per pound
Ph is the hull price in dollars per ton
Wm is the weight of soybean meal in pounds per bushel and Wh is the weight of hulls in pounds per bushel
The weight of hulls can be either positive or negative for removal or addition . The key feature of the model is that it includes National Oilseed Processors Association (NOPA) soybean meal trading rules. The rules limit the amount of hulls that can be included in the meal, because exceeding the fiber limit is so costly that a processor will chose to give away protein in preference to receiving a 10: 1 fiber discount. Higher soybean protein contents allow the processor to include more hulls in the meal while still meeting the protein specifications. This results in greater meal yield. When hulls are added to the meal Wh is positive, otherwise Wh is negative. As protein content is increased, a point is reached where there is no additional value gained from increased protein content. This is because of the fiber limitation on soybean meal. The processor cannot add more hulls, resulting in a greater meal yield without exceeding the fiber specification. Additional value comes from increase in oil content alone. This method accurately measures the marginal benefit of increasing protein and oil in soybeans and with the prices of meal and oil included in the model, provides an improved estimate of the marginal value product of soybeans. The EPV also reflects the current market conditions through changes in the price of soybean meal and oil.
At the implementation level, only one processor, AGP Inc., has instituted a pricing scale based on protein and oil content. The structure of the premiums for the year 2001 is shown in Table l below. Premiums are awarded for oil above 19.5 % and higher and protein percentages 37 % and higher. The minimum oil required to receive the protein premium is 19.5%.Protein and oil are expressed on an as is moisture basis and components can be increased with drying. This premium system was found to be inadequate in providing effective incentives for growers because the protein levels required to qualify for a protein premium are so high that they are unlikely to be achieved.
Also, there is a minimum oil level to get a protein premium. Protein percentages above 3 7% qualified for a premium of 3 cents per bushel. Therefore the incentives for protein are not likely to compete with that of oil when there is an inverse relationship between the two components. To overcome and correct these limitations, a pricing system for soybeans is proposed that would reflect the marginal value of protein and oil in soybeans. It will also include base premium payments to compensate for the yield drag and account for variability in the production of components across regions and years. Interest in component pricing sterns from the important question of how much value could be added to the soybean crop through component pricing and whether this added value is economically significant. Prominent among the studies that have estimated the social costs and benefits from pricing components in soybeans are those by Perrin (1980) and Updaw (1980) . Perrin estimated moderate gains while Updaw estimated losses for the society as a whole as a result of the introduction of component pricing. Updaw developed an economic model of the production of soybeans and market equilibrium in the soybean oil and meal markets.
He estimated the production possibility frontier of meal and oil with the varieties of soybean that were used in production between 1971-75. These models took the general equilibrium two good economy approach to modeling the soybean market. The change in quantities supplied for a change in price was estimated using the production possibilities frontier. The changes in prices and quantities were used to measure the consumer's and producer's surplus. These changes would be economy wide and under the assumptions of the model, component pricing would have to be implemented on an economy wide basis. The results however might be different in a single processor-grower coordination effort where the actions of one processor or one grower would not affect equilibrium prices and quantities in the market. Hurburgh and Huck (1998) used data from the Iowa Soybean yield trials from the year 1997 to estimate the increase in value due to components in soybeans. The EPV was used as a measure of the value of protein and oil contained in the soybeans. A method for selecting varieties with higher yields and components was proposed. Among the highest yielding varieties those with the highest sum of protein and oil percentages were selected. EPV was regressed over the sum and it was found that the sum could predict EPV with a margin of error of ±0.3 units of standard deviation . The varieties were then ranked by yield and the top half was selected. Those varieties that were 0.5 and 1 standard deviation higher than the average sum were selected and their EPVs were predicted. The difference in EPVs from the average in the top half of the yields ranged between 12-24 cents a bushel.
Hurburgh and Huck therefore claimed that an increase in value of 12-24 cents a bushel could be achieved without a reduction in yield.
This method overestimates the benefits from component pricing in soybeans for several reasons.
• The yield of soybeans that is important in determining the total amount of meal and oil produced per acre of soybeans. The tradeoffs between yield and oil and protein and oil are important in determining the total value from the soybean crop. On closer examination of data it was found that there is also a significant variation in the yield and components even in the top half of the yields in the sample; therefore it cannot be assumed that the increased components can be achieved without a reduction in yield. The measure of surplus from component pricing should include the yield per acre because that would determine the total meal and oil that can be processed from an acre of soybeans produced.
• It also does not take into account the costs of processing soybeans. Costs of processing are measured per bushel of soybeans and an improvement in the quality of soybeans is akin to increasing the processing capacity.
The costs of measurement and segregation were estimated as 3 cents a bushel in 1991. Since then, the cost of the tester has been halved and accuracy improved so the costs were projected at 2 cents a bushel (2) where P 0 is the oil price in $/lb, P 44 is the 44% protein meal price in $/lb, Y and X are the protein and oil percentages at 13 percent moisture. Leffel used these models in making recommendations for soybean variety selection. Leffel showed that all three methods provided approximately the same valuation and recommended that soybean producers produce the highest yielding, high-oil soybeans assuming that the price of oil to the price of meal bears a 2: 1 ratio.
Several methods have been proposed to aid variety selection for growers, and each of these methods would depend on the component prices that are being used in the market. In this study, a method of selecting varieties is developed. Scarce data on variety and environmental effects prevent a more sophisticated econometric analysis. Data on yields of selected soybean varieties grown in different environments over several years will help to find the variety that will maximize surplus and reduce risk when soybeans are priced based on their components. The objectives of the study are:
• Develop a set of component prices or a grid that provides incentives for variety selection in soybeans that would maximize surplus per acre of soybeans produced.
• Estimate the potential surplus from variety selection and compare this surplus across several regions in Iowa and Illinois to see where the maximum benefits from component pricing will be captured.
• Find a decision rule that would help growers select the varieties that would maximize surplus for the growers and the processors.
The incentive payments for protein and oil are developed in a contract theory framework. The motivation to move from the traditional commodity market system to that of a contract based system comes from coordination benefits and risk sharing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . In a typical principal agent setting the actions of the agent are not observable to the principal. The contract is then designed in such a way to ensure that the agents would take actions that are desired by the principal.
Such models are called hidden action or moral hazard models. In such models, the actions that are contracted upon affect the profits of the principal. The profits of the principal are assumed to be stochastic. Though the actions of the agent are not observable, they can be inferred through a vector of signals. In the contract design problem of interest here the principal is assumed to be the processor, the grower is the agent who caries out actions on his behalf. The stochastic nature of production of components and the associated risk in production, hidden actions of the agents, the fact that the incentive payments can be conditi. oned on the quality measures that are observable by both parties and measurable by NIR; all these features make the framework very convenient to develop a set of incentive payments conditioned on observed and measurable yields, protein and oil outcomes in soybean production. This is how the risk incentive framework of the Principal Agent theory (Grossman and Hart, 1983 ) is used to design an optimal contract that can be used by the processors to provide incentives to growers to select varieties that can maximize EPV per bushel. It is assumed that growers will be able to take actions that can influence the quality of output. Under the commodity system, growers maximize yield per acre but under the contract they would maximize EPV per bushel. A variety selection rule that would maximize EPV per bushel from the soybean crop is developed. This surplus is estimated across different regions to find where the maximum benefits from component pricing can be captured. 
Test Program in Iowa:
Iowa Crop Performance tests for soybeans are conducted each year to provide information growers need to select the best varieties for their production conditions. Seed companies, Iowa Entries are grown in four-row plots with a row spacing of 27 inches. In this section the data described earlier are used to compare yields and components across regions in Iowa and estimate the increase in expected social surplus from improved variety selection.
The data are divided into Northern, Central and Southern regions using the convention adopted in the Iowa Soybean Yield Trials.
The mean and coefficient of variation for yield in bu/acre, protein and oil in percentages are reported in Estimation of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting:
It is assumed that under the commodity pricing system growers select varieties with relatively high yield per acre. Under a contract, processors provide incentives for growers to select varieties that have relatively high EPV per bushel. Let the action that growers take be variety selection. Let aL be the action of selecting varieties that are the highest yielding and let aH be the action that growers take to select varieties with the highest EPV per bushel. Let the EPV generated by taking action aL be denoted by V(r,ql aL) where r =protein, q=oil. Similarly V(r,ql aH) represents the EPV generated when action aH is taken by the grower. The processor wants to implement action aH by contracting.
The difference between the expected values of the EPV from taking action aH over taking action aL is an estimate of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting. Table 4 and 5 show the summary statistics of the data under the two proposed actions. 
The estimation of the social surplus from contracting is outlined below: 3. Calculation of the EPV: The EPV was calculated using SPROC V 2.42 for the protein oil combinations corresponding to each region and year combination. Each protein and oil combination gives a unique value of the EPV.
4. Estimation of the social surplus from contracting: The estimated j oint distribution of protein and oil is used to calculate the expected value of EPV from a bushel of soybeans conditional on each action. The difference between the expected value of EPV conditional on action aH over that conditioned on action aL gives an estimate of the expected increase in social surplus from contracting a bushel of soybeans. This is multiplied by the yield per acre to get the expected social surplus per acre of soybeans grown.
Regression analysis:
Under action aL, growers select the top yielding varieties of soybeans. The sample corresponding to action aL is the set of varieties that are in the top quartile in yield for each year and region. Growers taking action aH select varieties that have high EPV per bushel. The sample corresponding to the action aH is the top quartile of observations for each region and year in their EPV per bushel . Since there is considerable variability in yield and components across regions and years, it becomes necessary to estimate the distribution of protein and oil across the three regions and years under the assumed actions taken by the growers. Geographic differences in composition are primarily caused by environmental factors . The most important factor in explaining differences in composition in soybeans has been temperature. Soybeans from northern and western soybean growing states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa , Wisconsin) contained about 1.5 -2% less protein and 0.2 --0.5% more oil than soybeans from Southern States (Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina) (Hurburgh et.al. 1990 ) . Table 8 and 9. 
Bivariate density estimation of protein and oil:
The residuals from the distribution of protein and oil conditional on the actions aL and aH are used to estimate the bivariate density function of protein and oil conditional on the given action. Nonparametric kernel density methods are used to estimate these distributions. Non-parametric kernel density methods help to describe data when parametric distributions do not effectively summarize a data distribution. This typically happens when data are skewed or are multimodal. Non-parametric kernel density estimation is used to smooth a density estimate that accounts for such characteristics.
Kernel density estimation is a technique that averages a kernel function across observations to create a smooth approximation. The density function f(r,q J a;) i = L, H was estimated using the nonparametric kernel density estimator (Silverman, 1996) . The kernel density estimate is defined by the equation:
f(r,q I a,.)= - 
-tK(r-R,, q-Q;J nh,hq i•I h, hq
The estimated joint distributions under action aL and under action aH for the Northern district in l 998 are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The marginal density functions for rand q are estimated using the joint density function of (r,q). The marginal density function for r is defined as, f(r I a;) = J f(r , q I a)dq
Similarly, the marginal density function for q is defined as,
The estimated marginal distribution of protein and oil under the two actions for the Northern district in 1998 is displayed in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The vertical axes represent the probability density of protein and oil. The significant coefficients from the regression are added back to the estimated distribution to get the distribution for the relevant region and year combination. It is assumed that the distributions for each region and year differ in their mean values alone. It can be seen that quality incentives cause a shift in the marginal density of protein and oil. This shift represents the improvement in quality from contracting. It was found that the mean value for oil increased but the mean protein fell from contracting. But the variation in both protein and oil values reduced considerably from contracting. f 
Calculation of the EPV:
• The EPV was used as a measure of the value that can be generated from processing a bushel of soybeans. The Estimated Processed Value was calculated through the program SPROC V 2.42. The prices used are $166.26/ton for soybean meal, $0 .18/lb for soybean oil and $0.0 l/ton for hulls. These prices were the averages for the years 1998-2000 at Decatur,
Illinois. All the NOPA (National Oilseeds Processing Association) rules were applied. The limitations of fiber content of 3 .5 % for 48% meal was used. The discount for exceeding the maximum fiber specifications being 1% of the invoice price per 0.1 % fiber in excess of specification was used. A tolerance of 0.3 percentage points in fiber is allowed.
• The protein discount of 2 times the unit price of protein per 1 % protein below minimum specifications was used.
• The EPV was calculated on a 13 % moisture basis and no premiums were awarded for producing meal with protein content in excess of the specifications.
Figures 5 and 6 summarize the relationship between EPV and oil at fixed levels of protein.
Protein levels at 30,35,40 and 45 % were arbitrarily selected and the relationship with increased oil was examined. As oil is increased, EPV increases linearly when premiums are awarded for meal above 48%. When protein is not awarded with a premium for exceeding specifications above 48% and protein with levels of oil arbitrarily fixed at 14 %, 18% and 22%. These are shown in Figures 7 and 8. The EPV increased linearly and then became constant at higher levels of protein when EPV was not awarded with a premium. Increase in protein above a certain point does not increase the EPV, although these levels of protein can be physically achieved in the soybeans. This is because adding hulls to increase meal yield will exceed the fiber requirement. The processor cannot add more hulls, resulting in a greater meal yield without exceeding the fiber specification. Additional value comes from increase in oil content alone. When protein is rewarded with a premium for exceeding specifications of meal above 48%, the rate of increase of EPV falls after the target meal specification of 48% is reached. The incremental benefit from increased oil is linear, but it is not so for protein. Figure 5: EPV Vs Oil at fixed levels of protein . . . 
48% meal specifications

Estimation of the expected social surplus from contracting:
The estimation of the expected social surplus from contracting was done under the assumption that currently growers select varieties that have high yield per acre. Under a contract, growers select varieties that have high EPV per bushel. The surplus that can be obtained from contracting a bushel of soybeans is calculated as
where V(r ,q) is the EPV from processing a bushel of soybeans where r=percentage of protein in the soybeans , q=percentage of oil in the soybeans and f(r,qJa;) is the estimated distribution of protein and oil conditional on the action ai .
The estimated distributions are used to calculate the expected values of the EPV conditional on action al and action aH for Conventional varieties of soybeans for each region and year. It is assumed that the outcomes of protein and oil follow a discrete distribution. The EPV for each of these combinations of protein and oil are found. The estimated bivariate distribution of protein and oil is used to find the density at each of these points. These densities are multiplied by the EPV to get the expected value of the EPV for each region and year. These values are substituted into (9) to estimate the increase in expected social surplus from contracting.
. I The increase in surplus obtained from growing an acre of soybeans can be defined as (10) where S is the social surplus that be generated from contracting a bushel of soybeans and y is the yield per acre.
Assuming that there is no yield drag in the production of soybeans with higher components then y is the expected yield when action aL is taken. The calculated value of y is the average yield in the top quartile of yields selected by region and year. The expected surplus estimated per acre is shown in table 12. When it is assumed that there is no yield drag in the production of soybeans with higher components, the surplus from contracting soybeans averaged to $8.96 an acre. However, it is expected that there will be a fall in yield when soybeans with higher components are selected because of the inverse relationship between soybean yield and protein. The yield drag for each region and year combination was calculated as the percentage change in yield when action aL is implemented vis-a-vis action aH. The fall in yield averaged to -0.10 % when varieties are selected by the EPV per bushel rather than by yield. If y is the expected yield when action aH is taken, the value of y is calculated as 8.02 years the average yield of the soybeans in the top quartile ofEPY per bushel of soybeans selected. The social surplus that is generated per acre from contracting is then estimated in the table 14. The expected gains from contracting are estimated as $0.15 a bushel and $8.02 an acre of soybeans planted. This means that there are considerable gains from contracting and this value can be transferred from the processors to growers. A contract between processors and growers is designed that provides incentives for growers to include protein and oil in their variety selection decisions. The contract is designed based on the assumption that growers are risk-neutral. Therefore, the grower faces all the risk in the production of components.
I
CHAPTER 5. MODEL
A principal agent model is used to develop a contract between a single processor and grower.
The contract determines the compensation for a single bushel of soybeans based on its protein and oil content. The outline of a basic contract design problem is as follows. If actions of the grower are observable to the processor, the contract would specify the actions to be taken by the grower and the compensation that the processor would provide in return. But actions taken by the grower are not observable to the processor (hidden actions), therefore the contract must be designed in such a way that indirectly gives the grower incentives to take the same actions that would be contracted for if his actions are observable. In this problem the grower's compensation scheme is designed to give him incentives to include protein and oil in his variety selection decisions. Since the actions of the grower are not observable to the processor, he will condition the grower's compensation based on some vector of observable signals through which the processor can infer actions taken by the grower. In the current problem, these observable signals are the protein and oil percentages in soybeans. Protein and oil content are measurable and observable to both the processor and the grower. Let S = { (r , q ), r E R, q E Q} be the set of all possible realizations of s. Since s is fully observable by both parties, grower compensation can be specified for each level of s(r,q). Suppose that the processor offers a compensation schedule of the form w(r,q) = V(r,q)-a where a is some constant. This contract would give the grower compensation that equals V(r,q) except for a fixed payment a .
The processor is assumed to be risk neutral and his profits depend on the quality of inputs, and can be described by the function V(r,q), for simplicity can be written as V(s), an increasing and concave function . It is assumed that there is no price risk for both the processor and grower. Let a denote the action choice of the grower where a = {a L, a H } where aL denotes the action of selecting varieties that maximize yield per acre and a 8 being the action of selecting varieties that maximize EPV per bushel. Taking action aH will involve certain costs for the grower over action aL. These costs can be interpreted as the costs of searching and variety selection. Through the commodity market system growers take action aL and it is assumed that the processor wishes to implement aH through the contract. Action a 8 leads to higher profits for the processor but entails greater difficulty for the grower. The processor's profits are affected by the actions of the grower but are not fully determined by it because of natural risk in the production of components. The processor's profits are assumed to be stochastic and are conditional on the actions of the growers as described by the following conditional probability density function f(sl aL) and f(sJ aH) with f(
The assumption made here is that both the processor and the grower are risk-neutral. The utility function of the grower can be described as u(w)=w-c(a) where w is the compensation paid to the grower and c(a) is the cost of action. Since the grower is neutral he does not need to be insured against risk. The optimal contract for the processor solves the following problem Equation (11) states that the processor maximizes his profits less wage payments subject to the constraint that the expected utility of the grower should be greater than his reservation utility.
Reservation utility is the utility that the grower gets through the current pricing system, in this case being the price of soybeans in the commodity market system. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the compensation costs of the processor
Min Jw(s)f(s I a)ds
The processor optimally specifies the action level a= {a l ,aH} that maximizes his expected profits after compensating the grower.
Max fv(s)f(sj a)ds -~-g(a)
aetat ·"H f (15) a* is the optimal action that solves for ( 15) . Equation (15) specifies the processor' s profit and the -grower receives an expected utility of at least u . Using the specific form of the grower compensation
The grower is willing to accept this contract as long as it gives him an expected utility of at least u , as long as In the following section, the contract designed in the earlier section is estimated empirically in the case of soybean production. V(r,q) is the EPV of a bushel of soybeans for a given protein and oil content less processing costs. The costs of processing are set at 30 cents a bushel. To compute the compensation w( r, q) = V ( r, q) -a * , it is necessary to solve the equation ( 17) for a · .
The expected value of EPV per bushel of soybeans is computed for each location and year using the empirical bivariate distributions of protein and oil. If the action a H is optimal , then the expected return to the processor should be higher under this action. This means that
Normalizing g(aL) = 0 and asswning that the above equation holds with equality we have that
The expected value of V(r, q) under action a H was found to be $5.68/bu and the expected value of EPV per bushel is $5 .56 /bu under action a L for the Northern district in year 1998. This gave an estimate of g(aH) as 0.12 cents a bushel. g(aH) is interpreted as the cost of implementing a H over a L . Table 16 . Under such a payment scheme, it was found that the returns per acre for the grower are less than they would get under the commodity market system, because the increased payment per bushel does not compensate for the fall in yield due to production of soybeans with higher components. Therefore, it becomes necessary to compensate growers for the yield drag. This is done through a base payment b that satisfies the condition that the expected total returns to the grower from contracting an acre of soybeans should equal the expected total returns to the grower from producing an acre of soybeans and selling it in the commodity market. 
The value E(w(r,q)) is found through the payment scheme developed in A market price was of $5.07/bu was used which was the average price of soybeans for the years 1998-2001 in Decatur, I1linois. All premiums are awarded over the market price. A premium of $0.03/bu was awarded for protein above 37%. A minimum of 19.5 % oil was needed to get the protein premium. For protein levels below 37% and oil levels below 19 .4 % there are no premiums.
There was no premium when protein crossed the 37% level but the oil was below 19.5%. Above the 19 .5 % level oil, premium are granted irrespective of the protein levels, but to qualify for the protein premium, the level of oil had to be above 19 .5%.
Comparison in returns per bushel between the AGP component prices and the value based grid at selected protein and oil values shown in Table 19 below. Since the value based grid has a return calculated for each realization of the signal s, which are a protein oil combination in our example, while the AGP grid does not, they are compared only at certain combinations of protein and oil. To compare returns when protein is below 37%, the returns from the value added grid at 33% was chosen arbitrarily. Similarly oil values are arbitrarily selected. Since there was no increase in premiums above 37% for either grid, they are compared at the 37% protein value.
The returns from the value-based grid are always higher than the AGP grid when the payments are calculated with a compensation for the yield drag. This compensation leaves the grower with the same returns per acre as with the commodity price. It gives the processor a return a· . 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
This study examines component pricing in soybeans through a contract design perspective. It is shown through this approach, how a system of component prices can be designed and implemented to grow soybeans with higher protein and oil content. Preliminary examination of data and existing literature showed that there is considerable variability in the production of components both within and between regions and years. This makes it necessary to account for this variability in the contract design problem. This also brings in risk in the production of components into the problem. The optimal contract was designed using a Principal Agent model with a risk neutral processor and a risk neutral grower. In such a contract, the grower faces all the risk from the production of components. estimate the bivariate distribution of protein and oil conditional on actions taken by the grower. These bivariate distributions for protein and oil are estimated using non-parametric methods. The significant coefficients for the region and year indicators are added back to the estimated distribution of protein and oil to yield the distribution corresponding to each region and year. The bivariate distribution of protein and oil are used to estimate the expected value from processing in a given region and year conditional on actions taken by the grower. This makes it possible to develop a different component pricing scheme for each region and year. This is how variability in the production of components is taken into account in the contract design problem. The marginal distributions of protein and oil show the improvement in the distribution of protein and oil that can be brought about through a contract.
The estimated distributions for each region and year are used to estimate the expected increase in social surplus from contracting. This value was estimated to be $0.15 per bushel which translated into a per acre value $8.02 when a yield drag due to production of soybeans with higher components is taken into account. The expected social surplus from contracting varied considerably across years and regions. It can be concluded that there are substantial gains to be made from contracting through improvements in the distribution of protein and oil. Currently there are no premiums for producing soy meal that exceeds the 48% meal requirement. This puts a. limitation on the premiums for higher protein in soybeans. Therefore, the premiums for protein are constant above 37% protein. Unless processors can capture this value from the feed industry downstream, they will not be able to give higher premiums to the growers for their components.
All the data used in the analysis are from the Iowa Soybean Variety trials. Trial data are characterized by very small plots and superior crop management. It would be useful to compare it with the actual quality of yield and components that goes into the processors. Information on grower response with and without quality incentives will make it possible to estimate accurately the increase in social surplus or the improvement in quality from such incentives.
The biggest limitation is that the contract designed here only takes into account payments per bushel and payments made for contracting per acre could not be designed. Estimation of a multivariate distribution of yield and components will help estimate accurately the surplus from contracting and design a contract with payments per acre. Such a contract will help adjust for the fall in returns to the grower as a result of the reduced yi. eld not being overcome by the incentives for components. One of the implementation issues in the design and implementation of a contract is the
